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ABSTRACT 
We examine an aspect of the argument of Teppo Felin and Nicolai Foss (2011) where they 
reject the claim of Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) that habits depend crucially on stimuli from 
the social environment. We argue that while rightly stressing human agency they also create a 
false dichotomy between agential and environmental factors in the explanation. Felin and 
Foss create further confusion by hinting – without adequate clarification – at an untenable 
notion of human agency as an uncaused cause. We raise several questions of clarification for 
these authors.  
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Poverty of stimulus and absence of cause:  
Some questions for Felin and Foss 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen 
We welcome the stimulating contribution by Teppo Felin and Nicolai Foss (2011) to the 
analytical literature on routines. In this note we wish to briefly respond to one of their 
arguments and raise some questions for them concerning somewhat cryptic aspects of their 
stance. 
We understand that Felin and Foss wish to emphasise the role of human agency and 
individual psychology in the analysis of routines. In general terms we applaud that stance. 
But, as elaborated elsewhere, we think that the term ‘methodological individualism’ is 
misleading to describe such a view (Hodgson 2007). Any viable approach to the analysis of 
institutions in particular and social phenomena in general must incorporate both individuals 
and structured relations between individuals; the label of methodological individualism biases 
the account in one direction only. Posing individuals versus social structure as alternative 
explanantia is a false dichotomy.  
Felin and Foss quote our view on habits – which we regard as basic individual blocks for 
institutions and routines – where they ‘depend crucially upon stimuli from the social 
environment’ (Hodgson and Knudsen 2004, p. 289). Felin and Foss (2011) respond to the 
quoted passage: ‘Our point, on the other hand, is that stimuli and the environment necessarily 
cannot – given the poverty and degeneracy of the stimuli – be ascribed as the causal factors of 
behavior and capability.’  
This is yet another case of ambiguity and false dichotomy. Note the phrase ‘on the other 
hand’ depicts a dichotomy where none exists. Our position that habits ‘depend crucially upon 
stimuli from the social environment’ is perfectly consistent with Felin and Foss’s argument 
that they are insufficient as causes of capabilities or behaviour. We fully accept that they are 
insufficient: individual capabilities and behaviour also depend on individual personality, 
idiosyncrasy and (in part) on genetic make-up. The ‘stimuli from the social environment’ are 
necessary but insufficient.  
Our model of habit formation that Felin and Foss (2011) take issue with captures the 
accumulation of experience as an instance of sequential interaction between environmental 
variables and internal states of agents. This modelling strategy is quite common in 
behavioural and evolutionary approaches (March and Simon 1958, Nelson and Winter 1982). 
The agents’ propensity to acquire and interpret environmental feedback depends on their 
internal state, but their internal state adapts in response to the feedback they seek from the 
environment (including actions of other agents). As in other models of statistical learning, 
repetition of a particular action improves assessment of the mapping between action and 
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consequence.1 In contrast, Felin and Foss (2011) portray the agents’ experiences as instances 
of environmental stimuli. Their characterization of experience is rather strange because it 
ignores the mapping between environmental variables and internal states, a main feature of 
our model that is widely used in the behavioural and evolutionary literature (e.g. March and 
Simon 1958, Nelson and Winter 1982). Felin and Foss (2011) thereby assert the importance 
of human agency by misrepresenting the common characterization of causal arguments in this 
line of work. 2   
But asserting the importance of human agency does not give an excuse to terminate the 
search for causal explanation, which is the essence of science. We maintain that we are also 
required to explain the causes behind individual capacities and intentions, and not regard 
these as somehow uncaused, or beyond the reach of science 
In this area, the ambiguities in the position of Felin and Foss (2011) become further 
apparent when they argue for ‘free will’ and some causal ‘wiggle room’ or ‘Spielraum’. They 
use the term ‘indeterminacy’ – again without adequate definition. Given these allusions, do 
they regard intentions as (partially) uncaused, thus beyond the reach of (any eventual) causal 
explanation? For them, are (some portion of) intentions entirely caused or not? 
Clearly we are getting into very deep philosophical water here. But it is reasonable to ask 
for some clarifications regarding their position. 
We take a view that is consistent with what we believe to be the majority position among 
modern philosophers. We uphold that every phenomenon is caused and that the primary goal 
of science is causal explanation (e.g. Bunge 1959). We also take a position known as 
compatibilism, which upholds that a notion of free will is compatible with the proposition that 
wills are themselves caused (e.g. Frankfurt 1999). A view that human agency is somehow 
uncaused would create a no-go area for science and create an untenable dualism or mysticism. 
It would be inconsistent with the fact of human evolution from earlier species and ultimately 
from inorganic matter. We also note that terms such as determinism and indeterminacy are 
highly ambiguous and are used in several different and conflicting ways (Bunge 1959, 
Hodgson 2004). Again we would be interested in the more precise views of Felin and Foss. 
Having made our own marks in the sand – albeit sketchily – it is reasonable to ask for 
clarification on all the above points. Does the ‘poverty of stimulus’ argument imply that 
internal states are ultimate causes of human behaviour? Is the ‘poverty of stimulus’ argument 
intended to lead to a notion of human agency as an uncaused cause? For our part, we fully 
accept that each individual is unique and that variation between individuals renders 
inadequate any causal explanation based on stimulus or context alone. Indeed that stance is 
essential to the Darwinian approach that we have developed elsewhere (Hodgson and 
Knudsen 2010).  
Felin and Foss present some positions as being in opposition, when they are logically 
compatible. They are frequently unclear in their use of terminology, and they confuse claims 
of partial and complete determination. Further debate will be enhanced by some clear 
answers.  
                                                 
1 From standard models of statistical learning, it is easy to see why repetition can be useful. When the 
propagation of feedback is masked by noise, a decision maker can improve expectations about possible 
consequences of an action if she increases the sample size of that action (Gittins 1989, March 1991). 
2 For example, Felin and Foss (2011) ignore March and Simon’s (1958) careful discussion of internal states of 
human actors (including memory conditions).  
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